Population and household projections – Base 1/1/2024

General information

Demographic projections aim to map the likely future of a population in terms of its total size and structural components, taking into account the underlying uncertainty surrounding demographic behavior (fertility, survival and migration). This type of product is used by policymakers both as a knowledge tool for assessing population aging trends and as a source for developing further forecasting models. The potential uses of the demographic projections are numerous, ranging from healthcare and social security planning, from urban planning to energy and environmental planning, from the organization of school facilities to transportation networks.

With the “Previsioni della popolazione e delle famiglie” project, included in the National Statistical Program (PSN code IST-01448), Istat has been responding to these needs for over thirty years, originally on an occasional basis, but subsequently annually (since 2017).

It is important to remember that the data made available should be treated with caution, especially over the long term. Indeed, demographic projections become increasingly uncertain the further away they are from the starting point, especially in small geographic areas. It should also be emphasized that demographic projections are a “what-if” exercise. That is, they are calculations in which the calculations performed show a particular population evolution that is the result of specific assumptions regarding demographic behavior.

Access to regional population projections data

There are three types of output:

1. population by region, sex and single age group;
2. components of the demographic balance by region;
3. main demographic indicators by region.

Each output type, in addition to presenting the results of the median scenario, is accompanied by 50%, 80%, and 90% confidence intervals.

The time-horizon of the projections is 2024-2080.

Regional population projections data are accessible both from the database IstatData and the thematic platform Demo.

Access to regional household’s projections data

There are three types of output:

1. population living in households by household position, five-year age groups and region;
2. households by household type and region;
3. mean number of household members.

Each output type presents the results of the median scenario only. The time-horizon of the projections is 2024-2050.

Regional household’s projections data are accessible both from the database IstatData and the thematic platform Demo.

Access to municipal population projections data

From this year this product is included in the Institute’s official statistics, after having been the subject of experimental statistics for four years.

There are three types of output:

1. population by municipality (province), sex and five-year age groups;
2. components of the population balance by municipality (province);
3. main demographic indicators by municipality (province).

Each output type presents the results of the median scenario only.

The time-horizon of the projections is 2024-2050.

The data are accessible online for the provinces and only for municipalities with population greater than 5,000 inhabitants.

Data for municipalities with fewer than 5,000 inhabitants is reserved for Sistan entities only. In this case, the Sistan office manager, or a delegate, must access the Contact Centre and select the “Release of microdata/Files for Sistan” service.

All users can obtain data for supra-municipal aggregations of interest following paid processing. Some available consolidated aggregations include, for example: Degurba, Local Labor Systems, Internal Areas and Mountain Communities. Alternatively, users can specify specific supra-municipal aggregations, provided they comply with data privacy principles. The request must be made through the Contact Centre, selecting the “Custom data processing” service.

Direct link to :

Data on municipal population projections (only for provinces and municipalities with populations greater than 5,000 inhabitants)are accessible both from the database IstatData and the thematic platform Demo.

Main results

Italy 2050: challenges and prospects of a society in transition

The latest demographic projections, updated to 2024, draw a transition process within which the weight of today’s age structure of the population prevails over expected demographic behavior, although within a framework of uncertainty.

In turn, further increase in survival, low birth rate and family transformations confirm an ongoing change in population structure that will result in a self-reinforcing aging process, despite the positive contribution of foreign migration.

The resident population, now about 59 million, is expected to decline to 54.7 million by 2050, with a gradual but steady decline over time.

By the same year, the share of the elderly aged 65 and older rises to 34.6 percent (from 24.3 percent), and that of individuals aged 15-64 falls to 54.3 percent (from 63.5 percent). The share of young people up to 14 years old drops by one percentage point (from 12.2 to 11.2 percent).

One in five households will be composed of a couple with children (today 3 in 10) while 41.1 percent of households will consist of lone persons (today 36.8 percent).

Population declines more than likely, but wide margin of variability

The expected future decline in the resident population follows the negative trend recorded over the past ten years. The “median” forecast scenario outlines a further decrease of 478,000 individuals by 2030 (to 58.5 million), with an average annual variation rate of -1.2‰. In the medium term, the decline in population accelerates from 58.5 million in 2030 to 54.7 million in 2050 (average annual variation rate of -3.3‰) (Table 1).

In the long term, the projected demographic trend has an even greater impact on population size. According to the median scenario, the population would fall to 45.8 million by 2080, a further decrease of 8.8 million compared to 2050 (average annual variation rate of -5.4‰). Under this hypothesis, the total decline from the base year of the projection (2024) would amount to 13.1 million residents. The uncertainty of demographic projections is positively correlated with the time horizon: the further the forecast year is from the base year, the greater the uncertainty. In 2050, the 90% confidence interval associated with the population size (i.e., the range within which the actual value is expected to fall with 90% probability) amounts to 4.1 million (52.5 – 56.8). In 2080, the interval is wide 13.8 million, with values ranging between 39.0 and 52.8 million.

Considering the extremes of the 90% confidence interval, in the most favourable scenario the population could shrink by “only” 6.2 million between 2024 and 2080, of which 2.2 million would already be lost by 2050. In contrast, under the most severe scenario, the population in 2080 would be 20.0 million lower than today, with a reduction of 6.5 million already occurring by 2050. In conclusion, a population decline appears inevitable, even if the numerical projections differ substantially from one another, pointing to possible futures that are not only demographically but also socially and economically diverse in their implications.

All areas of the country will experience gradual depopulation, although with geographical differences. This variability means that the phenomenon will be more pronounced in the South than in the Centre-North. According to the median scenario, in the short term the North is expected to see a slight but significant increase in population (+1.1‰ per year until 2030). In contrast, the Centre (-1.3‰) and especially the South (-4.8‰) are expected to experience a decline in resident population.

In the medium period (2030-2050), and even more so in the long term (2050-2080), population decline will affect all geographical areas, but the South will see the most intense reductions. In the long term, the population of the North could decrease by 2.8 million by 2080, but only by about 200,000 by 2050. The trajectory in the South is markedly different: its population could shrink by 7.9 million by 2080, with 3.4 million already lost by 2050.

The uncertainty accompanying the above projections may lead to different interpretations. In the North, for instance, a path of slight but continuous demographic growth is still possible (up to 1.1 million more residents by 2080), as shown by the upper bound of the confidence interval. By contrast, such a possibility is never projected for either the Centre or the South, even under the most favourable scenario assumptions.