JULY 28th 2025

statistiche report

Istat Istituto Nazionale di Statistica

POPULATION AND HOUSEHOLD PROJECTIONS | BASE 1/1/2024

Italy 2050: challenges and prospects of a society in transition

The latest **demographic projections**, updated to 2024, draw a transition process within which the weight of today's age structure of the population prevails over expected demographic behavior, although within a framework of uncertainty.

In turn, further increase in survival, low birth rate and family transformations confirm an ongoing change in population structure that will result in a self-reinforcing aging process, despite the positive contribution of foreign migration.

The **resident population**, now about 59 million, is expected to decline to 54.7 million by 2050, with a gradual but steady decline over time.

By the same year, the share of **the elderly aged 65 and older** rises to 34.6 percent (from 24.3 percent), and that of individuals **aged 15-64** falls to 54.3 percent (from 63.5 percent). The share of young people up to 14 years old drops by one percentage point (from 12.2 to 11.2 percent).

One in five households will be composed of a **couple with children** (today 3 in 10) while 41.1 percent of households will consist of **lone persons** (today 36.8 percent).

2.03

The average household size in 2050

2,21 in 2024

6.5 million

People over 65 expected to live alone in 2050

4.6 million in 2024

-7.7million

The decline in the working population aged 15-64 by 2050

From the current 37.4 million to 29.7

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Population declines more than likely, but wide margin of variability

The expected future decline in the resident population follows the negative trend recorded over the past ten years. The “median” forecast scenario outlines a further decrease of 478,000 individuals by 2030 (to 58.5 million), with an average annual variation rate of -1.2‰. In the medium term, the decline in population accelerates from 58.5 million in 2030 to 54.7 million in 2050 (average annual variation rate of -3.3‰) (Table 1).

In the long term, the projected demographic trend has an even greater impact on population size. According to the median scenario, the population would fall to 45.8 million by 2080, a further decrease of 8.8 million compared to 2050 (average annual variation rate of -5.4‰). Under this hypothesis, the total decline from the base year of the projection (2024) would amount to 13.1 million residents. The uncertainty of demographic projections is positively correlated with the time horizon: the further the forecast year is from the base year, the greater the uncertainty. In 2050, the 90% confidence interval associated with the population size (i.e., the range within which the actual value is expected to fall with 90% probability) amounts to 4.1 million (52.5 - 56.8). In 2080, the interval is wide 13.8 million, with values ranging between 39.0 and 52.8 million.

Considering the extremes of the 90% confidence interval, in the most favourable scenario the population could shrink by “only” 6.2 million between 2024 and 2080, of which 2.2 million would already be lost by 2050. In contrast, under the most severe scenario, the population in 2080 would be 20.0 million lower than today, with a reduction of 6.5 million already occurring by 2050. In conclusion, a population decline appears inevitable, even if the numerical projections differ substantially from one another, pointing to possible futures that are not only demographically but also socially and economically diverse in their implications.

All areas of the country will experience gradual depopulation, although with geographical differences. This variability means that the phenomenon will be more pronounced in the South than in the Centre-North. According to the median scenario, in the short term the North is expected to see a slight but significant increase in population (+1.1‰ per year until 2030). In contrast, the Centre (-1.3‰) and especially the South (-4.8‰) are expected to experience a decline in resident population.

In the medium period (2030-2050), and even more so in the long term (2050-2080), population decline will affect all geographical areas, but the South will see the most intense reductions. In the long term, the population of the North could decrease by 2.8 million by 2080, but only by about 200,000 by 2050. The trajectory in the South is markedly different: its population could shrink by 7.9 million by 2080, with 3.4 million already lost by 2050.

The uncertainty accompanying the above projections may lead to different interpretations. In the North, for instance, a path of slight but continuous demographic growth is still possible (up to 1.1 million more residents by 2080), as shown by the upper bound of the confidence interval. By contrast, such a possibility is never projected for either the Centre or the South, even under the most favourable scenario assumptions.

TABLE 1. RESIDENT POPULATION BY GEOGRAPHICAL AREA. MEDIAN SCENARIO AND 90% CONFIDENCE INTERVALS. Years 2024-2080, January 1st, million (*)

Geographical area	2024	2030	2040	2050	2080
North	27,5	27,7	27,6	27,3	24,7
		[27,5 / 27,8]	[27,1 / 28,1]	[26,1 / 28,4]	[20,9 / 28,6]
Centre	11,7	11,6	11,4	11,0	9,3
		[11,6 / 11,7]	[11,1 / 11,6]	[10,5 / 11,4]	[7,9 / 10,7]
South	19,9	19,2	17,9	16,4	11,9
		[19,1 / 19,3]	[17,6 / 18,2]	[15,8 / 17,0]	[10,2 / 13,6]
ITALY	**59,0**	**58,5**	**56,9**	**54,7**	**45,8**
		[58,3 / 58,7]	[55,9 / 57,9]	[52,5 / 56,8]	[39,0 / 52,8]

(*) Values under the confidence intervals in square brackets.

Irreversible natural balance, more uncertainty on the side of migration flows

For over 15 years, Italy has faced a negative natural balance, which underlies the population decline, despite the partial mitigation effect of positive net migration flows with foreign countries. This trend is expected to consolidate in the future. According to the median projection scenario, between 2024 and 2080, there would be a total of 20.5 million births, 43.7 million deaths, 18.0 million immigrations from abroad, and 8.2 million emigrations abroad. The transformation of the population will not only be quantitative, but also qualitative, profoundly changing its structural characteristics.

The level of uncertainty associated with different assumptions on future demographic behaviour supports the view that a return to balance between births and deaths is unlikely before 2080. In fact, even in the most favourable birth and mortality scenarios, the number of births does not compensate for the number of deaths. For example, the upper bound of the confidence interval for births (a scenario in which the average number of children per woman increases to 1.85 by 2080) identifies a number consistently lower than that projected at the lower bound of deaths (Figure 1).

In the median scenario, which assumes an increase in fertility from 1.18 children per woman in 2024 to 1.46 in 2080, the peak number of births is expected to reach 401,000 in 2038. Thereafter, the projected increase in average fertility levels does not lead to a parallel increase in births, as it is compensated by a progressive decline in the number of women of fertility age. It is sufficient to consider that in 2024, the number of women aged 15-49 amounts to 11.5 million, and under the median scenario, this amount is expected to shrink to 9.1 million in 2050 and to 7.6 million in 2080. Even under the most favourable fertility scenario - with a rise to 1.85 children per woman by 2080, and an intermediate value of 1.59 in 2050 - the number of births would remain below 500,000 annually.

Mortality will also be affected by changes in the age structure of the population. According to the median scenario, the number of deaths is projected to peak in 2059 (851,000), despite life expectancy being expected to increase throughout the projection period (to 86.1 years for men and 89.7 for women at birth in 2080, with gains of 4.4 and 4.1 years respectively compared to 2024).

The median scenario projects a largely positive net migration balance with foreign countries. A more intense initial phase is foreseen up to 2040, with an average annual net flow slightly below 200,000 units. This would be followed by a phase of stabilisation, lasting until 2080, with an average of 165,000 net immigrants per year.

Future migration flows are not expected to compensate the negative natural dynamics. Nevertheless, they are marked by uncertainty due to multiple factors (migration pressures in countries of origin, the economic and employment attractiveness of the country, instability in the international geopolitical context characterised by armed conflicts, and the potential alternation of periods of economic recession and recovery). As a result, long-term projections should be interpreted with great caution; from this perspective, it is significant that the 90% confidence interval for net migration with foreign countries in 2080 ranges from -20,000 to +349,000 individuals.

FIGURE 1. NATURAL AND MIGRATORY POPULATION MOVEMENT, MEDIAN SCENARIO, AND 90% CONFIDENCE INTERVALS IN ITALY. Years 2024-2080, January 1st, thousand



Uncertain level, but clear direction: Italians are becoming older and living longer

The population aged 65 and over currently accounts for 24.3% of the total, those aged 0-14 for 12.2%, and those aged 15-64 for 63.5%. The average age of the population has reached 46.6 years. Italy has thus already entered a marked and prolonged phase of population ageing. Future projections point to a further intensification of this process, driven mainly by the current age structure. This ongoing ageing is expected to have a greater impact than changes in fertility, mortality, or migration, contributing roughly two-thirds of the overall transformation, compared to one-third from the other components.

By 2050, the share of people aged 65 and over could reach 34.6% of the total under the median scenario, with a 90% confidence interval ranging between 33.2% and 35.9%. A significant increase is also expected among the population aged 85 and over, a group where a larger proportion of vulnerable individuals is concentrated: from 3.9% in 2024 to 7.2% in 2050, with confidence bounds ranging from 6.4% to 8%. Regardless of the specific trajectory, the impact on social protection policies will be considerable, given the increasing needs of the older population.

The share of young people aged 0-14 is projected to decline further to 11.2% by 2050 under the median scenario, despite a partially recovering fertility rate. In terms of intergenerational balance, the proportion of people aged 65 and over may exceed three times that of children and adolescents.

The continued ageing of the population will also result from the shift of the large baby boom cohorts (born in the 1960s and early 1970s) into older age groups. At the same time, the working-age population (15-64 years) is expected to fall to 54.3% under the median scenario, with a possible range between 53.2% and 55.4%. This trend confirms a well-defined evolution with significant consequences for the labour market and the sustainability of welfare systems.

Among the forthcoming demographic transformations, the ageing process in the South should be highlighted (Table 2). While this geographical area still shows a comparatively younger age profile, the average age of its residents is projected to rise from 45.8 years in 2024 to 51.6 years in 2050 (median scenario), surpassing both the North (50.2 years) and the Centre (51.2 years) in the same year.

TABLE 2. MEAN AGE OF THE POPULATION BY GEOGRAPHIC AREA, MEDIAN SCENARIO AND 90% CONFIDENCE INTERVALS Years 2024-2080, January 1st, in years and tenth of year (*).

Geographical area	2024	2030	2040	2050	2080
North	46,9	48,1	49,3	50,2	50,5
		[47,9 / 48,2]	[48,8 / 49,9]	[49,2 / 51,2]	[48,0 / 53,3]
Centre	47,2	48,6	50,2	51,2	51,0
		[48,4 / 48,7]	[49,7 / 50,7]	[50,2 / 52,1]	[48,5 / 53,8]
South	45,8	47,6	50,0	51,6	52,1
		[47,5 / 47,7]	[49,5 / 50,5]	[50,6 / 52,6]	[49,6 / 55,0]
ITALY	**46,6**	**48,0**	**49,7**	**50,8**	**51,0**
		[47,9 / 48,1]	[49,2 / 50,2]	[49,8 / 51,8]	[48,5 / 53,8]

(*) Values under the confidence intervals in square brackets.

Households with at least one family nucleus expected to decline

In the median scenario, the number of households in Italy increases from 26.5 million in 2024 to 27.2 million in 2040. After this first prolonged phase, it is expected to decrease slightly to 26.8 million in 2050. Overall, households would increase by 1% between 2024 and 2050.

The increase in the number of households will come mainly from a rise in those without a nucleus (i.e. those without a couple or a parent-child relationship), which will grow from 10.4 to 11.9 million (+14%), going to represent 44.3% of total households in 2050 (39.3% in 2024). On the contrary, households with at least one nucleus, which represent in the social imaginary the typical family, would decrease by more than 7%: such households, which in 2024 amounted to 16.1 million (60.7% of total households), would drop to 14.9 million in 2050, thus representing 55.7% of households (Table 3).

The decline in the number of families with nucleus is the result of the socio-demographic dynamics taking place in Italy in recent decades: the ageing of the population, with the increase in life expectancy, generates a greater number of single people; the prolonged drop in the birth rate increases the number of people without children; the increase in marital instability, following the greater number of dissolutions of couples, leads to a growing number of individuals living alone and single parents.

Household projections show a 'parabolic' development of their amount: a growth until 2040 followed by a decrease. This trend depends on a structural evolution of the population. In the first phase, the number of households increases on the back of the increase in people living alone (often elderly), then falls as the baby-boom generations gradually go out and the overall population shrinks.

The factors outlined above also lead to a gradual reduction in average household size, which will decrease from 2.21 members in 2024 to 2.03 in 2050, thus leading to ever smaller and more fragmented households. Households with at least one nucleus will also vary their average size from 2.91 to 2.73 members.

Growth in the share of single persons in total households

Increased life expectancy and marital instability, as mentioned, mean that people living alone will grow by 13% between 2024 and 2050, from 9.7 to 11 million in absolute terms and from 36.8% to 41.1% of total households. This increase, both absolute and relative, will dominate the overall growth in the number of households. Particularly pronounced will be the growth of women living alone, from 5.3 to 6.2 million (+18%). Men living alone on the other hand, will increase by 8%, from 4.5 to 4.8 million over the same period.

TABLE 3. NUMBER OF HOUSEHOLDS BY TYPE. Years 2024*, 2040, 2050, median scenario, thousand and percentage

	2024	2040	2050	2024	2040	2050
	ABSOLUTE VALUES			PERCENTAGE VALUES		
TOTAL HOUSEHOLDS	26.478	27.205	26.752	100,0	100,0	100,0
with at least one family nucleus	*16.073*	*15.662*	*14.899*	*60,7*	*57,6*	*55,7*
Childless couples	5.352	5.927	5.667	20,2	21,8	21,2
Couples with children	7.578	6.342	5.734	28,6	23,3	21,4
with at least a child under 20	*4.968*	*3.993*	*3.715*	*18,8*	*14,7*	*13,9*
Single mother with children	2.276	2.369	2.413	8,6	8,7	9,0
with at least a child under 20	1.012	1.059	*1.137*	*3,8*	*3,9*	*4,3*
Single father with children	618	746	819	2,3	2,7	3,1
with at least a child under 20	223	260	*302*	*0,8*	*1,0*	*1,1*
Households with 2+ family nuclei	249	279	267	0,9	1,0	1,0
without family nuclei	*10.405*	*11.543*	*11.853*	*39,3*	*42,4*	*44,3*
Lone persons	9.734	10.744	11.005	36,8	39,5	41,1
Male lone persons	*4.458*	*4.778*	*4.792*	*16,8*	*17,6*	*17,9*
Female lone persons	*5.276*	*5.967*	*6.213*	*19,9*	*21,9*	*23,2*
Multiperson households	672	798	849	2,5	2,9	3,2

(*) The multipurpose survey on "Daily Life Aspects" data are released on a two-year average. Here, the data refer to 1st January. For 2024 this can give rise to differences.

An increasing number of older people will be living alone

The increase in the number of people living alone has an important social impact, considering that it is especially in the older age groups that they increase significantly. In 2024, among the 9.7 million lone persons, those aged 65 and over amount to 4.6 million. In the years to come, the number of people aged 65 and over living alone is set to grow substantially, reaching 6.5 million in 2050.

For people living alone up to the age of 64, on the other hand, a more stable trend is expected. From the current 5.2 million, 60% of whom are men, this segment of the population is expected to fall to just under 5 million by 2035. Thereafter, due to the overall decline that will characterize the population in adulthood, it is expected to decline to around 4.5 million in 2050.

Even after the age of 65, living alone changes according to gender: in contrast to individuals up to the age of 64, in this case it is women who predominate numerically, thanks to their survival advantage. While in 2024 there were 3.2 million single women over 65 years of age, by the end of the projection period there will be 4.5 million, an increase of 41%. Among single men aged 65+, on the other hand, a growth from 1.3 million to about 2.0 million (+46%) is expected.

Living alone, often an involuntary circumstance, in the case of the older people can affect their quality of life, especially when limitations in daily activities increase. If, in fact, it becomes less and less frequent for individuals aged over 64 to experience limitations in functional capacities, the situation is quite different when the age threshold of 74 is exceeded, which is more prone to specific needs and frailties related to ageing. The number of people aged over 74 who will be living alone, in particular, is set to rise by more than 1.7 million (of whom 1.2 million will be women) in 2050, reaching an absolute amount of 4.6 million lone individuals (of whom 3.4 million will be women).

Toward a society with one couple with children for every five households

Due to low fertility in recent decades and based on the assumptions considered in the median scenario, couples with children are expected to continue to decline. Today there are 7.6 million and they account for less than three out of every 10 households (28.6%), by 2050 they could fall to 5.7 million (-24%) to just over two out of every 10 households (21.4%).

Slightly increasing, however, will be childless couples, which are expected to rise from 5.4 million in 2024 to 5.7 million in 2050 (+6%), making up 21.2% of total households. The opposing dynamic between child-bearing and childless couples implies a gradual narrowing of the numerical gap between the two household types. While nationally they would almost equalize by 2050, in some areas of the country - such as the North and the Center - the overtaking of the latter over the former would have already occurred by that date.

Growing marital instability will lead to a slight increase in lone parents, rising from 10.9% to 12.1% of total households between 2024 and 2050. In absolute values, the change would result from 2.9 to 3.2 million. For the most part, these will continue to be single mothers, as today, but the share of single fathers in the total number of single parents is expected to grow from 21 percent to 25 percent.

FIGURE 2. NUMBER OF COUPLES BY TYPE. Years 2024-2050, median scenario, thousand.



Converging household transformations between the North-Center and the South

In the past, the South had a higher fertility rate, while the Center and the North had higher rates of marital instability and a more pronounced aging of the population. In recent years, at least since the beginning of the new millennium, the picture has been partially changing: fertility is declining everywhere, even in Campania and Sicily, which maintain only a relative advantage; many regions in the South show more pronounced aging and are already inside an apparent spiral of no return on the structural level (e.g., Molise, Basilicata, Sardinia); finally, modern family transformations, although there is a greater diffusion of couples with children, have also affected the southern regions.

Within this framework, household projections only reinforce a territorial convergence, with the South transitioning toward sociodemographic patterns increasingly similar to those of the Center and North. In fact, a downward trend in households with at least one nucleus is expected to be particularly pronounced in the South (from 63.1% in 2024 to 57.6% in 2050), which, however, remains the area with the highest share of these households (North and Center would have 55.1% and 54.3%, respectively, in 2050). Couples with children will undergo the most significant changes. The South would maintain the highest proportion for this type of households, although their presence would appear to decrease significantly: from 31.5% in 2024 to 22.7% in 2050 (Figure 3).

Households without nuclei are confirmed to be more present in the North and the Center (in 2050 they would reach 44.9 percent and 45.7 percent, respectively). Nevertheless, the largest increase would be in the South, amounting to 5.5 percentage points (from 36.9% to 42.4%).

The social factors that will characterize the future of single people also seem to suggest a territorial convergence. In the North, single people are projected to be 41.9% in 2050, registering an increase of 4 percentage points over 2024. The same increase would be the one that lone persons would have in the Centre, but starting from a higher share this will lead that area to maintain its primacy (42.8%). More significant is the increase that would occur in the South (+4.9 percentage points, 38.7%), which will determine in that territorial area the condition of approaching the levels of the North-Center.

Childless couples are expected to grow slightly everywhere. They will continue to be more prevalent in the North (22.2% in 2050) while in the South they may rise to 20.2%.

The projected family transformations will lead to a common reduction in average household size throughout the country. If in Italy, as mentioned above, a decrease from 2.21 to 2.03 components is expected, in the North and Center, where today the values are 2.16 members, it could fall in 2050 to about 2, while the South would go from 2.32 to 2.06 components.

FIGURE 3. HOUSEHOLDS BY THE MAIN TYPES AND TERRITORIAL AREA, MEDIAN SCENARIO. Years 2024 and 2050, percentage values.



Glossary

Age specific fertility (rate): the ratio of the number of live births to women between the ages of x and x + 1 and the average number of women of that age in a given year.

Average number of children per woman: the number of children a woman would have if she was subjected to the fertility calendar (in the form of age-specific fertility rates) of a given calendar year during her reproductive life span.

Birth (rate): ratio between the number of live births in the year and the average amount of the resident population, multiplied by 1,000.

Cohort component (model): the continuous calculation algorithm that in iterative mode simulates the evolution of the fundamental population equation by age group, allowing to determine the demographic flows and to obtain the surviving population at the end of each year.

Couple: two people linked by an emotional and sentimental relationship. Can be formed by opposite or same sex people. The bonds between people in couples can be formal (de jure couple: married, civilly united or de facto cohabiting pursuant to Law 76/2016) or informal (de facto couple).

Death: the cessation of any sign of life at any time after the vital birth.

Demographic projection: elaboration that shows the future development of a population when certain assumptions are made regarding the future course of mortality, fertility and migration.

Deterministic demographic projection: elaboration on the future development of a population, summarized in a single series of values obtained from a single set of demographic assumptions, which does not report any measure regarding the uncertainty usually associated with the results.

Dependency ratio: ratio between the population of inactive age (0-14 years and 65 years and over) and the population of active age (15-64 years), multiplied by 100.

Elderly dependency ratio: ratio between the population aged 65 and over and the population aged 15-64, multiplied by 100.

Emigration for abroad (rate): the ratio between the number of emigrations to abroad and the average amount of the resident population, multiplied by 1,000.

Family households (or households with at least one family nucleus): includes couples with children, couples without children, single parents, families with two or more nucleus.

Non family Households (or households without nuclei): people living alone or multi-person families; this latter do not constitute a family unit even if composed of several people.

Family nucleus: group of people linked by ties of marriage, kinship, affinity, adoption, protection, or by emotional ties, cohabitants and having habitual residence in the same Municipality. It can also be constituted by a single person.

Household: group of persons who habitually live in the same household and are bound by marriage, civil partnership, kinship, affinity, adoption, guardianship or emotional ties and who share in the household's income (by contributing to or benefiting from it) and daily expenses. Within a household there may be one or more family nucleus, but there may also be none, as in the case of households formed by an isolated member (one-person household) or several isolated members (multiperson household).

Household typology: classification based on the presence or absence of at least one nucleus and by type of nucleus.

Immigration from abroad (rate): the ratio between the number of immigrations from abroad and the average amount of the resident population, multiplied by 1,000.

Internal emigration (rate): the ratio between the number of internal emigrations and the average amount of the resident population, multiplied by 1,000.

Internal immigration (rate): the ratio between the number of internal immigrations and the average amount of the resident population, multiplied by 1,000.

Internal migration balance: difference between the number of registrations for change of residence from another Municipality and the number of de-registrations for change of residence to another Municipality.

Internal net migration (rate): the difference between the internal immigration rate and the internal emigration rate.

Life expectancy at age "x": the average number of years that a person of completed age "x" can count to survive in the hypothesis that, in the course of his subsequent life, he was subjected to the risks of mortality by age (from age "x" up) of the year of observation.

Life expectancy at birth: the average number of years that a person can count to live from birth in the hypothesis that, in the course of his existence, he was subjected to mortality risks by age of the year of observation.

Live birth: the product of conception which, once expelled or completely extracted from the maternal body, regardless of the duration of gestation, breathes or manifests other signs of life.

Mean age: mean age of the population at a certain date expressed in years and tenths of a year.

Mean age at birth: the mean age at birth of mothers expressed in years and tenths of a year, calculated considering only live births.

Migratory balance with abroad: difference between the number of registrations for change of residence from abroad and the number of de-registrations for change of residence to abroad.

Mortality (rate of): ratio between the number of deaths in the year and the average amount of the resident population, multiplied by 1,000.

Natural balance: difference between the number of births and the number of deaths.

Natural growth (rate): the difference between the birth rate and the death rate.

Net migration with abroad (rate): the difference between the immigration rate from abroad and the emigration rate with abroad.

Old age (index): ratio between the population aged 65 and over and the population aged 0-14, multiplied by 100.

Predictive (or confidence) interval: an interval associated with a random variable yet to be observed, with a specific probability that the random variable falls within it.

Probabilistic demographic projection: elaboration on the future development of a population, summarized in a set of values or in a probability distribution, in which the variables used are of a random nature that cannot be predicted with certainty and in which not all assumptions are equally probable.

Probability of death: the probability that an individual of precise age x will die before the birthday x + 1.

Projection: development expected in the future.

Projection probability of death: the probability that an individual of age x (in years completed on 1st January) will not survive within the year.

Projection probability of interregional migration: the probability that an individual of age x (in years completed on January 1st) moves residence between two regions before the end of the year.

Range: measure of the variability of a quantitative phenomenon defined by the difference between its maximum and the minimum value.

Registration and de-registration for transfer of residence: registration concerns people who have moved to a Municipality from other Municipalities or from abroad; the de-registration concerns people who have moved to another municipality or abroad.

Resident population: constituted in each Municipality (and similarly for other territorial divisions) of people with habitual residence in the Municipality itself. Persons temporarily residing in another Municipality or abroad, for the exercise of seasonal occupations or for reasons of limited duration, do not cease to belong to the resident population.

Scenario approach: the description of the context, even conceptual, in which the population is projected. In a deterministic approach it usually refers to the main or central assumption. In a stochastic it can refer to the assumption identified as mean or median.

Simulation: the quantitative implementation of a single set of demographic assumptions to be launched in the cohort-component model in order to obtain a single set of demographic projections.

Total balance: sum of the natural balance and the total migratory balance.

Total growth (rate of): the sum of the total net migration rate and the natural growth rate.

Total migratory balance: the sum of the migration balance with abroad and the internal migration balance.

Total net migration (rate): the sum of the net internal migration rate and the net migration rate with abroad.

For technical and methodological clarification

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